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THE NURTURING
STANCE:MAKING SENSE
OF RESPONSIBILITY
WITHOUT BLAME
BY
DAPHNE BRANDENBURG
Abstract: Mental health-care clinicians report that they hold patients responsible
for morally objectionable behaviour but at the same time consider blaming
attitudes to be inappropriate. These practices present a conundrum for all
Strawsonian theories of responsibility. In response to this conundrum, Pickard
has proposed severing the Strawsonian connection between being responsible
and being an appropriate target of blaming attitudes. In this article I will argue
that her solution fails to explain the practices at stake and provide an alternative
solution that uncovers an under-theorized stance we take towards those whose
abilities are underdeveloped or compromised.
The central aim of this article is to make sense of a type of responsibility
practice that is central to mental health-care contexts. This practice can be
characterized as ‘allocating responsibility without blame’ (Pickard, 2013).
When a patient behaves in a manner that does not meet moral standards –
e.g. verbally abuses someone, throws things across the room or is aggressive
and threatening towards other patients or staff – it is considered good
practice to hold the patient responsible for this, but blaming the patient is
typically considered inappropriate. It may at first seem difficult for both
clinicians and philosophers to make sense of this practice. This difficulty is
due to the intuitive link between someone’s responsibility for harm and the
appropriateness of blaming attitudes towards this person. This link is one
that has been stressed most prominently by Strawsonian theories of
responsibility. In the first section I will expand on the apparent tension
between Strawsonian theories and these practices of allocating responsibility
without blame.
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There is one rather straightforward explanation for refraining from
expressing blaming attitudes to a patient in psychiatric practice that does
not pose a problem for Strawsonians. The expression of blame can be
detrimental to the therapeutic relationship and to the patient’s wellbeing.
This provides reasons not to blame the patient, especially for a clinician
whose main concern is the patient’s recovery. However, these reasons do
not undermine the appropriateness of blaming attitudes; they only render
the expression of these attitudes inappropriate in a clinical context. I will
briefly discuss this non-threatening explanation in Section 2. But, although
this may be an accurate explanation for some practices of holding patients
responsible without blaming them, it certainly does not adequately explain
all of these practices.
Sometimes clinicians refrain from blaming a patient for causing harm or
abuse because the patient is not considered blameworthy. Even in these
cases, however, the patient is, in a sense, held responsible. The challenge this
presents us with is a more serious one. It has to be explained how and why a
patient is held responsible after behaving in amorally problematic way when
he is, at the same time, not considered to blame for this behaviour and
blaming attitudes are therefore inappropriate. The rest of the article is
concerned with solving this challenge.
Hannah Pickard proposes solving this challenge by severing the link
between someone’s responsibility on the one hand and the appropriateness
of moral blame on the other hand. According to her, one’s responsibility
should be based on the normative capacities that one has, but responsibility
can be detached from blaming attitudes (Pickard, 2013). In Section 3 I will
argue that Pickard’s solution fails to explain the practices at stake. I argue
that she in fact fails to detach the appropriateness of blame from the
normative capacities that one has to have to meet moral expectations.
As an alternative solution, I propose that responsibility without blame
does not track full-blown normative capacities and responsibility for harm,
but instead has underdeveloped or compromised capacities as its target.
Underdeveloped or compromised capacity grounds the type of
responsibility that is central to responsibility without blame: a responsibility
towork towards developing or repairing one’s ownmoral abilities. I dub this
form of holding responsible ‘the nurturing stance’. This responsibility to
engage with one’s own impairments differs from but closely relates to
traditional responsibility for harm.
In conclusion I argue that the nurturing stance does not undermine the
Strawsonian theories at stake but does provide an important addition to
them. In practices of allocating responsibility without blame, patients are
held to the responsibilities they have to become able to meet moral expecta-
tions. This stance is a common but under-discussed aspect of our moral
practices. The Strawsonian typically overlooks it by suggesting that we
may appropriately respond to a moral transgression by either blaming or
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exempting the person; this stance shows that such a binary approach is
misleading. People who transgress a norm are sometimes not blamed for this
because they couldn’t help transgressing, but when they can become able to
meet our norms, our attitude towards them in response to this transgression
is not properly described as exempting.
1. Strawsonians and the clinical conundrum
P.F. Strawson observes that there is a connection between our reactive atti-
tudes and being a responsible agent. Strawson notices that when we respond
with resentment, indignation or similar blame-related attitudes to another
person’s actions, we typically consider this appropriate if the agent
disregarded our shared moral expectations and demands. But if someone’s
abilities to meet these interpersonal demands are severely underdeveloped
or impaired, we generally feel differently: wemodify, suspend or do not even
experience these attitudes, or, at the very least, think we should not respond
with indignation or resentment (Strawson, 1962). Blaming attitudes are con-
sidered to be an inappropriate response to someone whose underdeveloped
or impaired normative capacities render them unable to meet the demand
at stake. This does not mean that we never resent someone whose transgres-
sion was due to impaired normative capacities, but it is generally accepted
that we should not do so. Blaming the incompetent for transgressing a norm
that they cannot meet is generally considered inappropriate.
Many philosophers after Strawson have agreed that being responsible
implies being an appropriate target for praising or blaming attitudes. Some
have argued that these attitudes generally indicate or track the criteria that
make for a responsible agent (Wallace, 1996). Others prefer to say that
our disposition to praise and blame is what constitutes the responsibility of
the subject of such praise or blame (Shoemaker, 2015; Watson, 2004; for
discussion see Todd, 2016). Which criteria exactly are singled out by these
attitudes and hence are the responsibility-making features of an agent is also
a matter of debate. But although the details of this relation are fleshed out
differently, many maintain that an agent is responsible if, and only if, she
is an appropriate target of blaming or praising attitudes (i.e. Fischer and
Ravizza, 1998; Shoemaker, 2015; Wallace, 1996; Watson, 1993).
But this connection between blaming responses and responsibility gives
rise to a clinical conundrum. The clinical conundrum arises if one takes a
close look at nursing practices in psychiatry. Clinicians hold patients to be
responsible for their actions when they misbehave, but often consider
blaming them to be inappropriate (Pickard, 2013). My understanding is that
this practice should be imagined as follows: imagine that a patient is throw-
ing a chair across a living room, thereby breaking things and endangering
THE NURTURING STANCE 7
© 2017 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2017 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
and upsetting other patients. In response to this transgression, good practice
prescribes that a clinician speaks to the patient later and says something like
‘I understand that you were upset, but this behaviour cannot be accepted
here. What are you going to do about it? And how can we help you?’
Clinicians report that they consider the patient to be responsible for his
own behaviour and hold him responsible for it in such a case (Brandenburg,
2010unpublished). That the patient is held responsible in this practice is
prima facie a plausible description of what is going on here. I take it that
the patient is being held responsible when it is pointed out to this person that
his or her behaviour was problematic and it is made explicit that changing
this is expected of her and (at least partly) considered up to him or her. This
is the form of holding responsible that will be central to this article.
Note that the patient is not blamed in such a situation. The clinicianwould
not address the patient with anger, resentment or indignation, nor would she
say something like ‘You had no concern for us or others’ or ‘You have been
negligent. You should know better than this’ or ‘This is your fault!’ and so
on. Such responses would be considered grossly inappropriate.
Pickard describes how this practice at first struck her as a philosophical
and clinical conundrum. She could make sense of the idea that, despite
appearance, patients are not responsible or culpable because of their disor-
der and hence are not to be met with anger or resentment. She could also
make sense of the idea that despite their disorder they are responsible and
culpable and hence liable to anger or resentment. But she found it difficult
to make sense of this stance of allocating responsibility without blame
(Pickard, 2013, p. 1135). Family, friends and clinicians of patients who
transgress in these ways and often encounter the same difficulty in making
sense of this practice of allocating responsibility without blame. The two
questions that will be central to this article are as follows: how can this
conundrum be solved, and how is the Strawsonian relation between reactive
attitudes and responsibility affected by this solution?
2. Responsibility without expressed blame
Surely some of the practices described above may concern patients who are
blameworthy for what they have done.1 Whatever the exact criteria for
blameworthiness are, a patient may – just like anyone else – meet these
criteria on some occasions (McKenna and Kozuch, 2015; Sripada, 2015).
Maybe the patient throwing the chair across the room knew very well that
he had got himself into a situation that would make him uncontrollably
upset, andmaybe it would also have been quite easy for him to avoid getting
into this situation. Even then, responding in a blaming fashion is typically
considered inappropriate within a clinical context.
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A blaming response can undermine the patient’s trust in the clinician and
make him feel rejected, which in turn compromises the therapeutic relation-
ship and the patient’s recovery. A clinician may also find it inappropriate to
blame the patient because such a response doesn’t fit well with her profes-
sional and caring role. Pickard seems to suggest that it is always crucial that
clinicians refrain from expressing blaming attitudes, even when a patient is
blameworthy, so as not to risk damaging therapeutic efficacy (Lacey and
Pickard, 2013; Pickard, 2013). I believe that this is taking it too far. There
are reports of cases in clinical settings in which a temporary and moderate
expression of anger or indignation has been conducive to a better therapeu-
tic relationship and has actually worked towards certain therapeutic aims
(Brandenburg, 2010unpublished). But blaming attitudes are better held at
bay if they would stand in the way of a good therapeutic relationship and
meeting therapeutic aims even when a patient culpably misbehaves.
Of course, more generally speaking, giving expression to blaming
attitudes is not always the appropriate thing to do, even in cases where the
person is blameworthy for transgressing a certain norm. Angela Smith has
before pointed out how these observations would pose a serious objection
to those Strawsonian theories that suggest that the expression of blaming
attitudes is always fair and appropriate when a competent agent expresses
ill will or insufficient regard (i.e. is blameworthy) (Wallace, 1996,
pp. 187–193; Smith, 2007).
But the existence of further conditions for the appropriate expression of
blame ultimately does not challenge the Strawsonian relation between the
appropriateness of blaming attitudes and someone’s responsibility for harm.
If the subject from our example is blameworthy, blame is still an appropriate
response in a similar sense to the way in which fear would be an appropriate
response to something being dangerous (Russell, 1992). This appropriate-
ness relation still holds even if other considerations trump the appropriate-
ness of expressing blame in a specific context. A comparable example is
that although it may be very unwise and ineffective to give expression to fear
when confronted with a roaring lion, the experience of fear is not thereby
inappropriate. On the contrary, as an appraisal of the situation this is an
accurate response.
In our imagined case, where the patient is blameworthy for throwing a
chair through the room, the experience of blame-related attitudes in
response to this action would also still be appropriate. Whilst expressing
reproach may not be efficient or useful in this case, it is certainly apt to feel
reproachful in the light of what the patient has done. In addition, this
solution to the conundrum, strictly speaking, does not provide us with a case
of responsibility without blame; it only provides us with a case of responsi-
bility without expressed blame.
But this solution does not apply to all those cases in which a clinician
holds a patient responsible without blaming the patient. In some cases
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blaming attitudes would be inappropriate because it would be wrong to say
that the patient is blameworthy for transgressing a certain norm. Imagine
that the patient in our case could not foresee that getting into this situation
would get him as upset as it did, and that the emotional overload was just
beyond his control at that very moment. He felt unsafe, got very stressed
and threw a chair across the room, which at that point seemed for him
to be the only way to deal with his feelings. We also know that because
of his mental illness he is much more likely to get stressed in such situations
and never really learned how to cope with that stress. Even in such a case,
and in many similar cases, a patient will typically be held responsible for
this behaviour in the sense described in the first section. How are we to
explain that the clinician holds the patient responsible when the patient is
not blameworthy for her behaviour? In Section 3 I will discuss Hannah
Pickard’s solution to this challenge and argue that it fails to explain the
practices at stake.
3. Responsibility without blameworthiness
Pickard also points out that psychiatric patients often cannot be consid-
ered blameworthy for what they do. In order to explain why patients
are nonetheless held responsible, she proposes separating responsibility
for harm from blameworthiness for harm. According to her, patients are
responsible for norm-transgressions but are not blameworthy (Pickard,
2013, pp. 1141–1142). Hereby Pickard provides a solution to our
challenge. The patient is held responsible for the transgression because
he is responsible for the transgression. But blaming the person is deeply
inappropriate, because the patient is not blameworthy for the
transgression. This solution drives a wedge between being responsible on
the one hand and being an appropriate target for blaming attitudes on
the other. But her solution is conceptually puzzling and not satisfactory
as it stands.
Pickard defends her conceptual solution of ‘responsibility without blame’
by probing the reader’s intuitions. As readers we are asked to compare the
following:
1. Service users may be responsible for verbal aggression towards
clinicians but not blameworthy, because they are acting to relieve
high levels of psychological distress, and lack alternative coping
mechanisms (Pickard, 2013, p. 1140).
2. *Service users may be morally responsible for verbal aggression
towards clinicians but not blameworthy, because they are acting to
relieve high levels of psychological distress, and lack alternative
coping mechanisms (Pickard, 2013, p. 1140).
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The distinction between the two descriptions is demonstrated by the fact
that 1 is intuitively plausible whilst 2 is not, and it explains, according to
Pickard, how it is ‘possible to be responsible and treated thus, for actions
which are morally wrong but for which one is not blameworthy because
one has an excuse’ (Pickard, 2013, p. 1142). But it is not very clear why
our intuitions should diverge here if the actions at stake are indeed morally
problematic and the agent is responsible for those actions. As far as my own
intuitions are concerned, if the patient has capacities for control then
intuitively he is both responsible and blameworthy, and if he does not have
the capacities for control, then he is neither responsible nor blameworthy.
The distinction between responsibility and moral responsibility doesn’t help
avoid this conclusion.
Pickard is explicit in sentence 1 about explaining patients’ responsibility
on the basis of their ‘capacities for choice and control’. According to
Pickard, it is because patients have such normative capacities to refrain from
inflicting abuse or harm that they should be held to account for their actions.
But if it were true that patients have these capacities, then it would be
intuitive to say that they are accountable and blameworthy for the things they
do. They are culpable because they have the capacities for choice and control
and hence can control their behaviour and can choose to refrain from doing
harm. If Pickard is right about this, we should simply say that patients are
responsible and blameworthy for the harms and wrongs they do but that
one should not respond by means of expressing blaming attitudes because
this is detrimental to therapy (Pickard, 2013, p. 1142).
The second half of statement 1 raises even more questions. According to
Pickard, patients are often not blameworthy because they are excused. The
patients are excused because ‘they are acting to relieve high levels of psycho-
logical distress, and lack alternative coping mechanisms’ (Pickard, 2013,
p. 1140). This does indeed seem to be a likely explanation for the absence
of blameworthiness, or at least for a strong mitigation of blameworthiness.
But now it is unclear why Pickard wants to maintain that patients have the
capacities for choice and control and are therefore responsible for verbal
aggression. If one has problems with regulating emotions and lacks
alternative copingmechanisms, one is – all other things being equal – neither
responsible nor culpable for the harm one does, because one’s capacity for
control is impeded. It seems strange to hold someone responsible for a
transgression like throwing a chair across a room or verbal aggression when
this transgression is due to a serious control impediment.
The one way in which it may make sense to say that the person is nonethe-
less responsible in such a case is when one means to say that the persons is
causally responsible for what happened. But note that this can’t be right
either, because if one is merely causally responsible it is mysterious why
one would be held responsible for what happened. Imagine someone is
pushed over and breaks a vase as they fall; they are therefore causally
THE NURTURING STANCE 11
© 2017 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2017 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
responsible for breaking the vase. It would in such a case be totally ludicrous
to go up to this person and tell her that this behaviour cannot be tolerated
and that she should do something about it. Hence, we are still left with the
fascinating question of why these patients in practice are more than just
causally held responsible if they are not culpable because of their impaired
ability for control.
An interesting answer to this question remains obscured because of
ambiguity about what it means to have capacities for control. I think
Pickard is wrong to say that the patients in our examples simply ‘have the
capacity for choice and control’ that is required, because these patients
cannot control themselves in certain stressful situations. But there is a sense
in which it also wrong to say that these patients do not have the capacity to
control themselves in such situations. I will explain why, and this will in turn
provide us with a clue for answering the challenge at stake.
4. Ambiguous capacities
In this section I will argue that there is an important sense in which
patients who are held responsible without blame do not have the capacities
to meet certain expectations to refrain from causing harm or abuse but
another sense in which they do have these capacities. The crux is that in
natural language, when we claim that someone has the capacity to do
something, we may also be referring to capacities that are underdeveloped
or compromised.
Compare the following sentences:
1. You have the capacity to walk.
2. You have the capacity to be a great leader.
Or:
1. You have the capacity to resist the extra glass of beer.
2. You have the capacity to get your driving licence.
Note that the meaning of ‘capacity’ is often different in sentences of type 1
and type 2. When put next to each other this becomes quite clear. The word
‘can’ or ‘capacity’ in type 1 sentences refers to something someone is
normally able to do. Human beings can usually walk and they can resist
the extra glass of beer inmost circumstances too. In these sentences the word
capacity simply refers to abilities that we take the average human being to
have. When I say that you have the capacity to walk, I mean that you can
get up and do so right now.
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But being a great leader requires experience and learning.Most people can
be said to have the capacity to be a great leader because they can be a great
leader with sufficient practice and experience. And, even when you have the
skills to be a great leader, there may be periods when your leadership falters
because, say, lack of sleep or stress compromise your ability to exercise good
leadership. However, even when your capacity to be a great leader is
underdeveloped or compromised, I would not be lying when I say to you
that you have the capacity to be a great leader. Similarly, when someone tells
me that I have the capacity to get my driving licence after I have just had a
driving lesson that left me in utter despair, this does not mean that I can get
into a car and pass the driving test right now. On the contrary, it may very
well be fatal to me, or others, if I try to do so. But still, this person is not
necessarily wrong by telling me that I can get my driving licence, because
with sufficient practice and training even I will probably be able to pass
the test and get my licence.
The use of the word capacity in type 2 sentences refers to abilities that are
available to us in the future after we have engaged in learning processes and/
or have overcome the obstacles that are needed to develop or restore these
abilities. These capacities differ from those that are developed and
uncompromised. From now on I will refer to the latter as actual capacities,
in contrast to underdeveloped or compromised capacities. Now that these
different meanings of the word capacity are clear, I can return to Pickard’s
claim that patients have the requisite capacities for meeting the demands
at stake. Pickard, for example, wants to say that
• Patients have the capacity to refrain from engaging in alcohol abuse;
and
• Patients have the capacity to refrain from engaging in verbal
aggression.
My contention is that in psychiatry, these two sentences are typically
meant to refer to capacities that are either underdeveloped or compromised.
One possible explanation for the patient’s failure to meet an expectation or
standard at this moment or in specific types of circumstances is that her
ability to meet such expectations is underdeveloped or compromised. I do
not want to claim that this is what Pickard means. I0m not sure it is, but I
do think it is one good way to make sense of what she may mean. Though
the average adult has the capacity to refrain from, say, using verbal aggres-
sion or abusing alcohol, many patients in the clinic have this capacity in an
underdeveloped or compromised sense. Their abilities to, for example,
refrain from being verbally aggressive or engaging in other types of abusive
behaviour are yet to be developed or restored by, for instance, acquiring
certain habits, lowering their levels of stress or anxiety and/or learning
how to cope with their emotions. The transgressions from our examples
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are often due to excessive anxiety, stress or other forms of emotional
flooding. One further remark is therefore required here. It has been argued
that being overcome by stress or anxiety may fleetingly mask an actual
capacity (McKenna and Kozuch, 2015, p. 94). It should be noted that in
clinical settings transgressions are more often due to robust forms of
emotional flooding and hence to inhibitions of actual capacity rather than to
‘incidentalmasking’ of capacity to which everybodymay be subject at times.
Norm transgressions in psychiatry are often, though not always, due to
the patient’s underdeveloped or compromised ability to refrain from causing
harm or abuse. Pickard would be wrong to say that these patients have the
capacity for controlling and voluntary choosing to live up to these expecta-
tions if she means to say that they have the actual ability to do so to the same
extent that the average adult in the street. But they do have the capacity in an
underdeveloped or compromised sense. Capacity is an ambiguous term that
can, among other things, refer to abilities that are underdeveloped or
compromised (Morriss, 2002, pp. 52–60). Making this explicit will help us
to explain why patients are at times held responsible for their actions even
though they are not, or are hardly, blameworthy for what they have done.
5. The nurturing stance
Recall that the challenge is to explain how it is possible that patients are held
responsible after a norm-transgression but are at the same time not blame-
worthy for this norm-transgression. My solution to the challenge is the
following explanation: although actual capacities are typically coupled to
both responsibility and culpability for a moral transgression, underdevel-
oped or compromised capacities are coupled to another type of responsibil-
ity. The ability to develop or restore certain abilities gives rise to the
responsibility to engage with one’s own failure by means of developing or
restoring these abilities. This responsibility becomes salient and is something
one is held to when a reasonably grave norm transgression takes place.
Strictly speaking, the patients are then not responsible for what they have
done, but they are responsible for altering these ‘types of doings’. To see
how actual capacity, compromised capacity and the absence of capacity give
rise to different responsibility practices, consider the following normative
scenario.
On a forgotten archipelago there is a community that has few food
resources except for the fish swimming at the bottom of the sea. An average
member of this community has the skills to dive for the fish and feed herself
and some of the young, elderly and sick. But catching fish is hard, and there
are times when there are hardly enough fish to live from. It is of course
therefore expected that all the able community members dive for fish, and
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those who are able to do so but don’t are considered responsible and
culpable for this. Other members of this community may reasonably get
angry with these people, and surely they don’t deserve to get any fish.
But there are also members of this community who do not learn to dive
and hold their breath long enough as quickly and easily as the others because
of their fear of the deep, dark water. One of these members is Toddy. One
often finds him standing hesitantly on the shore for a while and once he gets
into the water he doesn’t manage to dive all the way to the bottom of the sea.
It seems inappropriate to respond with resentment or indignation to his
failure to get himself some fish because it is not that Toddy disregards the
norms of his community; his ability to live up to the norms is
underdeveloped and compromised by fear.
But the other members of this community will probably not cater to his
need for fish as they would for the sick, the elderly and infants. Though
they may give Toddy some fish, this would probably be on the condition
that he does something about overcoming his fear and further develops
his diving skills. Toddy is not like the elderly, the sick and infants, who
cannot be expected to dive for fish at all. Toddy can’t do it now but there
is reason to assume that he may become able to fend for himself and, given
the scarcity of fish and the work involved in diving for it, Toddy will be
expected to do so.
In terms of the interpersonal practices of the community, this expectation
is made explicit when Toddy fails to get fish again. Maybe not every time,
but most of the times when Toddy comes out of the water empty-handed
are occasions for the others to remind him how pressing the community
demand to fend for your own fish is. They will perhaps encouragingly tell
him, ‘You have the capacity to do this, Toddy, we know you do!’ or say
more serious things to him, such as, ‘You know things can’t go on like this.
We have many mouths to feed.’ This is surely a form of holding Toddy
responsible for this type of behaviour. But it is not a form of holding him
responsible and culpable for his specific past failure to meet a norm. That
would only be appropriate if Toddy already had the abilities to live up to this
norm. Toddy, however, does not get exempted like the infants, the elderly
and the sick, because he does have the abilities to meet this norm in an
underdeveloped or compromised sense. These abilities ground a form of
holding responsible that targets and bootstraps his potential to develop or
repair them.
Similarly, if in our own lifeworlds climbing a mountain were to somehow
become a strong moral requirement, we may ask everyone to learn to climb
a mountain because they ‘can’. Our underdeveloped or compromised
abilities imbue us with certain responsibilities when these abilities are or
become related to strong normative demands. In the process of acquiring
these capacities, we typically keep holding one another accountable by
reminding each other of this important expectation and by making explicit
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that we need to live up to it on those occasions that we fail to do so. But
note also that we thereby do not blame one another for failing to climb a
mountain now. Instead, when someone fails to climb a mountain we
remind this person that she should become able to do so and that it is
required of her to keep trying and learning. We are more likely to show
sympathy and understanding in response to failure. This goes hand in hand
with reminding someone of and holding someone to their responsibilities.
In such scenarios we typically hold one another responsible without
considering the other to be culpable and without responding (experiencing
or expressing) with feelings of resentment, contempt or agent-directed
anger.
The scenarios just discussed involve similar elements to what happens in
those situations within a psychiatric setting where a patient is not considered
to be blameworthy for moral harm but is held to account in response to this
transgression. Just like Toddy’s failure tomeet an expectation, the transgres-
sions in clinical settings may be due to underdeveloped or compromised
capacities. In a clinical setting, one may similarly be held responsible by
being urged to work towards acquiring the sort of control that enables one
to refrain from important norm-transgressions. And, of course, where
possible the clinicians will help and assist in this learning process.
Such a response is illustrative of good practice surrounding
norm-transgressions that come about as a result of stress, troubles with
coping or other things that stand in the way of the ability to meet certain
expectations. This response appropriately recognizes and targets the
underdeveloped or compromised capacities the patient has, is conducive of
therapeutic effectiveness and is in line with duties of care. I believe that in
such a scenario, the patient is then indeed held responsible because he can
do otherwise. But he is not blamed because he can’t do otherwise. Both
are true because can here refers to different types of capacities.
Please note that this does not mean that the patient in question was
already able to learn not to transgress norms and should have already done
so. That would reduce my account to a form of indirect responsibility,
which would permit blame. This is atypical for patients in psychiatry. It
is more plausible to assume that they are already engaging in this learning
process, do not know how to engage in a learning process, do not believe or
trust themselves to be able to do so and/or can only do so with a sufficient
level of support that they did not have before. In these cases, blame would
be an inapt response, but there is some value in holding patients to an
expectation by urging them to engage in developing and repairing their
abilities. Such a nurturing stance bootstraps patients’ agency to develop
or repair capacity and recognizes them as people who are able to do so.
Before discussing the implications of my solution for Strawsonian
theories, I want to end with some reservations. Firstly, in practice it is
of course very difficult to determine whether normative capacities are
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compromised or underdeveloped. By providing such a schematic over-
view, I do not want to deny the difficulties involved in assessing whether
norm-transgressions are due to compromised or underdeveloped capacities
or to insufficient regard or ill will. Secondly, it should also be noted that
the capacities or incapacities at stake are context-dependent and norm-
dependent. They are norm-dependent because the capacity to meet one
norm can be independent of the capacity to meet another norm. One may,
for example, have difficulties in refraining from abusing alcohol whilst being
perfectly able to refrain from using verbal aggression, or the other way
around. These capacities are also context-dependent because one may be
more or less able to do something in different contexts and at different
moments in time (Vargas, 2013). This further complicates real-life
assessment.
These assessment problems, of course, also apply to assessing whether
someone has the abilities to develop or repair his or her underdeveloped or
compromised agency. In reality one is often uncertain about these abilities
when relating to someone who struggles to live up to moral expectations.
But where uncertainty about abilities gives one reason to be careful and
hesitant in allocating blame for harm, the uncertainty about one’s abilities
for learning does not, in the same way, give one reason to be careful in
adopting a nurturing stance towards the person.
It is often more respectful and constructive to persist for quite a while in
assuming and hoping that the addressee has abilities for learning and
improving that can be engaged and bootstrapped by a nurturing stance, even
when this is uncertain. Note how people sometimes engage abilities for
learning that are quite probably themselves underdeveloped. Carers can be
seen to respond to children as young as two or three in a nurturing manner:
they tell them what they ought and ought not do in response to their
objectionable behaviour.2 It is at quite an early age already that a child
may be minimally responsive to this stance and may be engaged in his or
her own development in some minimal way. As they grow older, this ability
for engagement further increases and develops. The same can be true for the
abilities of psychiatric patients.
But in cases of uncertainty about the (level of) ability to engage in devel-
oping and repairing one’s agency, a continuous failure and lack of improve-
ment on the part of the addressee of the nurturing stance provides more
reason to wonder whether one is expecting too much of the person than
reason to allocate blame for these failures. Uncertainty about someone’s
(level of) abilities for learning does not undermine the appropriateness of
employing a nurturing stance towards this person but does count against
blaming him or her for subsequent failures to learn and improve. I take it
that this is why we generally are – and should be – hesitant to blame children
until they are in quite a late stage of their development and avoid blaming
patients in relapse too.
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6. Strawsonians and the nurturing stance
The nurturing stance does not undermine the Strawsonian story about
the appropriateness of blaming attitudes, but it does provide an
interesting addition to them. In order to meet Pickard’s challenge,
Strawsonians need to explain why the patient is not blameworthy for a
transgression but is nonetheless responsible without thereby denying that
‘being responsible’ means ‘being an appropriate target of praising and
blaming attitudes’. I do not have the space to discuss all Strawsonian
accounts of the required abilities for being responsible and an appro-
priate target of blaming attitudes here. My only aim in this section is
to show how prominent Strawsonian accounts can perfectly explain the
following:
1. Why the patient in our example is not an appropriate target of
blaming attitudes because the patient lacks the abilities required for
responsible agency, i.e. is not responsible, and
2. Why the patient is – in another sense – responsible and that this
responsibility is still connected to being an appropriate target for
praising and blaming attitudes.
Fischer and Ravizza argue that the abilities required for being an apt
target of praising and blaming attitudes are at least the ability to grasp
and apply moral reasons and the ability to act in the light of such reasons,
and Wallace defends a similar position (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998;
Wallace, 1996). The patient in our example may very well be able to grasp
moral reasons. He knows, for example, that the risk of injury and damage
provides a reason to refrain from throwing a chair across the room. But he
lacks the ability to act in the light of such reasons in stressful situations.
Because his ability is impeded in this sense, blaming him for transgressions
within such contexts would be inapt because in these contexts some of the
abilities required for responsible agency are impaired. Wallace and,
Fischer and Ravizza can also explain why, as I have argued, the patient
bears some responsibility for becoming able to handle stressful situations.
The patient has this responsibility because he can grasp and understand
why the norm ‘you should become able to refrain from throwing things
around when you get stressed’ is a legitimate one, and he can – possibly
with some help – come to act in the light of this norm, i.e. there is reason
to assume that he can become able to refrain from throwing things
around. But note that this also makes him liable to blame again. Those
features that make him responsible are also the features that make him
an apt target for blame if he does not comply with the demand to improve
himself out of insufficient regard for this norm. The Strawsonian connec-
tion is still intact.
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Other theorists, likeWatson andMcKenna, focus on the abilities required
for being morally addressed (McKenna, 1998; Watson, 1993). According to
such theories, the patient in our example may at first seem to be responsible
and blameworthy to the extent that he can be addressed in terms of reactive
attitudes. He can, in other words, understand what is being communicated
by such attitudes. But the ability to understand praising and blaming atti-
tudes is not enough on these accounts. Watson writes that the demand
expressed by these attitudes should be inhibited in response to the person’s
incompetence ‘in some or all respects for “ordinary adult interpersonal rela-
tionships”’ (Watson, 1993, p. 123). According toWatson, if a person cannot
express himself because of great strain or stress, the demand that he should
express good will and regard should be inhibited. The person is not then ap-
propriately addressed by reactive attitudes that communicate a demand the
person could not meet because of such impairments (Watson, 1993, p. 131).
McKenna similarly argues that apt targets of our responsibility practices
should understand what others communicate to them within those practices
and should not be impaired in such a way that they cannot themselves –
through their deeds – communicate within those practices (McKenna,
2012). Because of this, both McKenna and Watson are able to explain
why the patient in our example is not an appropriate target for blame but
is still responsible in another sense.
The patient is not an apt target because in the specific types of contexts in
which the transgression takes place (stressful contexts), he is not able to com-
municate within a normative practice; he cannot – within such contexts –
respond to the demand that would be expressed through reactive attitudes
such as anger or indignation. Therefore the patient is not an apt target for
blame when it comes to transgressions that occur under stressful
circumstances. But when it comes to another demand that is central to our
practices, the patient can understand, communicate and participate. The
demand ‘to develop the skills necessary for norm compliance in stressful
contexts’ is a norm that the patient can understand when it is being commu-
nicated to him and he can ‘communicatively participate’within this aspect of
our normative practice, i.e. he can respond to this demand. This is then the
kind of responsibility he does have and this responsibility is still something
that would make him liable to be a target of blaming attitudes if he were
to disregard the demand for development. Hence, the conundrum, as I
understand it, ultimately does not seriously undermine the Strawsonian
connection on these prominent accounts.
But the nurturing stance does provide an important addition to a
Strawsonian theory. Most Strawsonians tell an incomplete story when it
comes to our repertoire of responses to norm transgressions. The suggestion
often seems to be that we can either evaluate the person as responsible for the
transgression, in which case blaming attitudes are an appropriate response,
or we can consider the person to be exempted from responsibility for the
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transgression, which means that our blaming attitudes are suspended and
the person is seen as someone to be ‘managed’ ‘handled’ or ‘controlled’
rather than to be held responsible and reasoned with (Strawson, 1962;
Wallace, 1996; Watson, 1993). Their relative silence about other forms of
responding to transgressions suggests there are none, and this gives rise to
the conundrum this article began with.
The nurturing stance is a response to a transgression that crucially differs
from this description of interpersonal exempting. When a person is only
exempted in response to harm that has been done and is in no way held
responsible, we consider the person to be unable to develop or repair the
inabilities that explain why a norm was transgressed. We, as it were, ‘give
up’ on seeing the person as a current or potential participant in our norm-
guided moral practices and instead see the person as someone to be
‘managed’ or ‘handled’. But in the case of a nurturing stance, the harm done
gives rise to a future responsibility that is expressed in the way that we relate
to the person after he non-culpably fails to meet an interpersonal demand.
We urge the person to take (or keep taking) responsibility for developing
and repairing his own compromised or underdeveloped abilities. When
one is subject to the nurturing stance, one is reasoned with and called upon.
By adopting a nurturing stance, one recognizes and respects the other person
as someone who can come to meet the shared expectations and norms at
stake and bootstraps these capacities. By (only) exempting the person, these
abilities for development or repair would not be duly respected, and by
blaming the person we would misrecognize one’s underdeveloped or
compromised agency. The nurturing stance is an interpersonal response to
norm-transgressions that does not reduce to interpersonal exempting or to
interpersonal blaming.
I suspect that in all interactive processes surrounding the development or
repair of an ability to live up to a norm, this form of relating to one another
can be found. Because the nurturing stance is so common to our interper-
sonal practices and because it is different from both exempting and blaming
a person, it provides an important addition to any Strawsonian theory of
responsibility.
7. Conclusion
I have argued that the Strawsonian connection between ‘being responsible’
and ‘being an appropriate target of praising and blaming attitudes’ seems
to give rise to a conundrum in mental health-care practice. The conundrum
is that patients are often not blamed but are held responsible after norm-
transgressions occur. The most interesting version of this challenge is the
one in which the patient is not blamed because he is not blameworthy, but
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nonetheless is held responsible. The challenge was to explain why patients
are held responsible when they are not blameworthy and to spell out what
this implies for the Strawsonian theories at stake. I have argued that these
patients are held responsible because they have an underdeveloped or
compromised capacity – rather than an actual capacity – to meet the norms
that they transgressed. They are therefore held to their responsibility to
engage in a process of developing or repairing these capacities. This solution
to the conundrum ultimately does not undermine the Strawsonian theories
at stake. But it brings to the fore a type of response to norm-transgressions
that is a central but under-theorized aspect of our interpersonal practices.3.4
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NOTES
1 I do not want to exclude the possibility of blameworthiness – even in clinical contexts –
here, but please note that I am not thereby committed to saying that moral scepticism is false
either. It is still possible that the fittingness criteria for blame that are common to our practices
are not sufficient justification for blame (Milam, 2016; Pereboom, 2001; Russell, 1992).
2 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
3 This article is part of a PhD project funded by TheNetherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO). Research project ‘Management of the Self: a Humanities Approach to
Self-Management in Psychiatry and Psychosomatic Medicine’ Project number: 360–20-360.
4 Thanks to Matthew Talbert, Michael McKenna, Jeanette Kennett, Marc Slors, Jan
Bransen andDerek Strijbos for their comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to the Gothenburg
Responsibility Project for giving me the opportunity to present this paper.
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